Russophone Baltic Motherland: Vestiges of the USSR, false dialogues, and infiltration of Baltic society

Ben Worsley
Consultant; Associate of the CSS
9 January 2024

Significant Russian influence is present in the Baltic States, primarily fuelled by a historical connection to the Russian Motherland. Despite the Baltic States' membership of the EU and NATO, remnants of the USSR persist within their borders, potentially posing a threat to EU law and order.

Given Russia's historical ties to the Baltics, and its disregard for international law, concerns arise regarding potential actions aimed at creating a pathway between Belorussia and the enclave of Kaliningrad to reintegrate it into Russia's mainland. Such a move could involve the invasion of NATO member states, triggering NATO's Article Five and leading to a conflict between Russia and NATO.

In the current geopolitical climate, interactions between Russia and other actors, like Iran, raise the possibility of broader geopolitical consequences.

War in Europe would not only serve the interests of organised criminal gangs (OCGs) and members of organised criminal financial networks (OCFNs), who view conflict as an opportunity for theft and trafficking, but it would also benefit leaders of various states with authoritarian tendencies. These leaders, along with compromised elites, seek to exploit their positions to establish constructed dictatorships and further their own self-interests.

It is crucial to recognise that those who stand to gain from conflict are manipulating sentiments tied to the Russian Motherland to entice Russia into perilous actions. Therefore, it is essential to scrutinise the concept of Motherland and how it is being distorted and exploited for ulterior motives.

Motherland itself is a poetic notion. Whether Elgar or Chekov, it is a notion which, in its purest form, may be without blemish. Indeed, pride in a nation state may be a driver for the support of law and order. However, in modern Russia, the concept of Motherland has been weaponised. In modern Russia, the concept of Motherland has become part of the apparatus of constructed fascism.

In order to understand the factors that create belief in Motherland, and its use in constructed fascist society, we have to consider history, alongside overlays of addiction, organised crime, religion, the USSR, and Russia’s physical environment.

The physical landscape of Russia was a core part of the life and the aesthetic of the USSR. The sheer size of Russia allowed for multiple myths and devices to take their places as part of the construct of the Soviet Union. These factors include both the beauty and the cruelty of a land the size of Russia. From intense heat to freezing cold, the land has produced its totems and taboos which have been written about, painted, and photographed, and were then formed into part of the Soviet dialogue. These fact-based yet idealised stories found their way to the centre of the dictum of Motherland. Aestheticism is part of this. The breadth of visual cultures and ethnicities across the USSR has allowed for the story of Motherland to be one of design and beauty.

Mysticism and Orthodoxy play roles in Russian beliefs about Motherland. Be it pagan summer fires or long midwinter Orthodox services, the exotic tribal sense of Russian religious and spiritual traditions has also become a vital element of Motherland; touching the Russian peoples’ souls at the most fundamental points of life and death, and entwining with the Russian landscape and the Russian aesthetic.

Addiction to suffering, to power, to life, to death, and to the intrinsic nature of Motherland, has created a self-sustaining method of keeping alive the myths of Motherland. This is important when considering the Baltics and how Russian influence continues to attach itself there via self-sustaining processes. The power of the addiction to Motherland should not be underestimated. When a family has no money and no say in its society, all that is left is belief in ideologies driven by aesthetics, religion, and also violence and chaos. Motherland fills this place, and is fundamental to the nature of life in Russia.

Memories of fallen family members and brothers-in-arms are a well-known facet of Russian Motherland. However, it is made all the more important by becoming entwined with the other factors discussed herein. Heroes of the Great Patriotic War became totems of the USSR and Russia. Russia's current leadership is exploiting this history to solidify the concepts of glory through sacrificing for the Motherland and portraying Russia as a victim.

Motherland has been weaponised by the Russian state. This has been done by publicly co-mingling dialogues about Motherland with fascist dialogues which have been constructed in order to control Russian society and promote the self-interest of the siloviki and OCGs. The resultant product is extremely toxic, as it pulls on the heartstrings of nationalistic history.

The Baltics were long regarded as one of the playgrounds for the elite of the USSR. The cleanliness and beauty of the Baltic coasts, the aesthetic of the Baltic cities and the Baltic peoples, and the relative openness of life there compared to life in central Moscow meant that the Baltics were visited, and then inhabited, by the elite of the USSR. This trend has continued over the last thirty years since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The vestiges of inhabitation by Russia’s elite; linked to the Russian military, Russian intelligence services, and the Russian government, remain. It is these vestiges which are driving interference in the modern-day Baltic states and thereby the EU.

Russian inhabitation has extended to the strengthening of historical and current trade links between Russia and the Baltics. This trade is particularly focused on banking and finance. As a result, the Baltics have become a centre for Russia-related OCGs and OCFNs. An associated result of this is that the Baltics have become a base for Russian state-related influencers and agents linked to state activity, organised crime, and illicit finance.

The vestiges of the USSR and modern Russia continue to permeate Baltic society. There can be no doubt that Russian influence includes active Russian state-organised intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) by highly trained current and former employees of the GRU, the SVR, and the FSB.

Whilst the EU has made efforts to enforce and promote Western European law in the Baltics, significant Russian self-interested influence into Baltic businesses and Baltic society continues to exist. The simple fact that there is a large Russian state-related community in the Baltics is, in and of itself, proof that the heritage links and vestiges still exist. These links are being used by the Russian intelligence services in order to promote their state interests and agendas. These interests and agendas include efforts to break down equitable forms of law in the Baltic states, and efforts to influence governments, the media, and society.

The West should see Russian influence in the Baltics as the sharp end of Kremlin activity in the European Union. Russian operatives and enablers in the Baltics will be under the direct control of the Russian intelligence services, the Russian military, and Russia-related OCGs and OCFNs.

ISR of these Russian networks should operate with no illusions about the fact that such ISR will be directly against the Kremlin and the Kremlin’s desire to sow chaos in Europe. Military planning should also take this view into account.

Responses to Russian influence may fall into two general categories. These are creating resilience in Baltic society, so as to halt the tide of Russian influence, and direct ISR of Russia-related individuals, businesses, and organisations.

Resilience involves strengthening adherence to law in society and business, and in ensuring that disinformation is not allowed to interfere in society.

Kremlin activity is set to centre around an attritional, long-term strategy with the aim of safeguarding current embedded assets and operations, establishing additional assets and operations, and reinforcing messaging to undermine Baltic society. This approach hinges on making foreign influence appear 'normal' and part of the 'day-to-day.' The Kremlin aims to gradually influence the Baltics, event by event. Countering this while adhering to Western law demands a counter-attritional strategy. It follows that responses must be implemented on a daily basis.

The nostalgia for Motherland should not be underestimated in the task of building resilience. Many senior members of the Baltics’ governments, regulators, law enforcement agencies, and other institutions, will either feel this nostalgia directly or will have been brought up as children under the influence of nostalgia for Motherland. Thus, actions and defences which might seem standard in Western Europe may be slow to take root in the Baltics. Using this nostalgia for Motherland as cover for influence is an important part of Russian attritional strategy.

A core part of resilience is to identify and take action against enablers involved in illicit finance, enablers involved in social supply lines (estate agents and catering, etc.), and societal influencers (on social media and in wider society), who promote Kremlin agendas.

There is a crossover between mapping enablers, and ISR of Russian intelligence assets, and members of Russia-related OCGs and OCFNs. There are a plethora of Russian ex-military, ex-police, and ex-agency employees living in the Baltics. These people can and will be being used as assets-in-place by the GRU and the SVR. In terms of ISR, these ex-employees should be seen as Kremlin assets. In terms of OCGs, the view must be that they are as compromised as the most malign of the Russian mafia groups with whom they are working. Additionally, if Russia was to take control of the Suwałki Gap and start a war, current ISR of Russian assets would provide a useful target list of Russian-related collaborative agents.

In conclusion, the deep-rooted Russian influence in the Baltic States, fuelled by historical ties and the manipulation of the concept of Motherland, presents a multifaceted challenge to European stability. Responding to this requires planned resilience, involving strengthening adherence to the principles of international law, countering disinformation, and identifying enablers of Russian influence. Understanding the historical, cultural, and geopolitical factors at play is crucial for implementing daily responses and long-term strategies to safeguard the Baltic States against the disruptive influence of Russia.